I think this is pointing to exactly the right questions, re MacIntyre's history of rationality. I'll write a note-restack expanding on that agreement later, but in the meantime: well-chosen objections!
It is odd to me that more virtue ethicists don't more commonly draw on biology. It seems to me to fairly straightforwardly vindicate the basic Aristotelian picture of humans as being made to be rational social animals, and ethics being largely a result of that nature. And if we look at how for other animals we try to let them exercise their particular natural capacities in order to guarantee their flourishing (eg keeping social animals in groups, giving dolphins space and opportunity to play and use their brains), this fits exactly with Aristotle's idea that our happiness relies on us exercising our distinctive human capacities.
That's a good point. To give Alasdair MacIntyre his due, I believe he actually does do this in "Dependent Rational Animals"--which I have not read! Perhaps I should give it a look.
This is perhaps a dumb question, but isn’t the kind of integrity necessary for being honest with oneself, and for seeking truth—the kind of integrity you value—also a kind of virtue?
Maybe MacIntyre just picks the wrong virtues, or wrongly inflected virtues?
I think this is pointing to exactly the right questions, re MacIntyre's history of rationality. I'll write a note-restack expanding on that agreement later, but in the meantime: well-chosen objections!
Excellent post.
It is odd to me that more virtue ethicists don't more commonly draw on biology. It seems to me to fairly straightforwardly vindicate the basic Aristotelian picture of humans as being made to be rational social animals, and ethics being largely a result of that nature. And if we look at how for other animals we try to let them exercise their particular natural capacities in order to guarantee their flourishing (eg keeping social animals in groups, giving dolphins space and opportunity to play and use their brains), this fits exactly with Aristotle's idea that our happiness relies on us exercising our distinctive human capacities.
That's a good point. To give Alasdair MacIntyre his due, I believe he actually does do this in "Dependent Rational Animals"--which I have not read! Perhaps I should give it a look.
This is perhaps a dumb question, but isn’t the kind of integrity necessary for being honest with oneself, and for seeking truth—the kind of integrity you value—also a kind of virtue?
Maybe MacIntyre just picks the wrong virtues, or wrongly inflected virtues?
Interesting and excellent as always!